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CREATOR / CREATURES RELATION: 
"THE DISTINCTION" VS. "ONTO-THEOLOGY"
David B. Burrell, C.S.C.
Can philosophical inquiry into divinity be authentic to its subject, God, with­
out adapting its categories to the challenges of its scriptural inspiration, be 
that biblical or Quranic? This essay argues that it cannot, and that the adapta­
tion, while it can be articulated in semantic terms, must rather amount to a 
transformation of standard philosophical strategies. Indeed, without such a 
radical transformation, "philosophy of religion" will inevitably mislead us 
into speaking of a "god" rather than our intended object.
Let me hear and understand how "in the beginning" you "made 
heaven and earth" . . . [for] lo, heaven and earth exist: they cry out 
that they have been created, for they are subject to change and varia­
tion, [and] "before we came to be, we did not exist in such wise as 
to be able to make ourselves." . . . You who are good made them, for 
they are good; you who are made them, for they are. We know all 
this, thanks to you, but our knowledge compared to your knowledge 
is ignorance.
[Yet] how did you make heaven and earth? You did not make them 
as does a human artist: . . . neither in heaven or upon earth have you 
made heaven and earth; . . . you did not hold in your hand anything 
out of which to make [them]: whence would you obtain this thing 
not made by you, out of which you made a new thing? . . . You spoke, 
therefore, and these things were made, and in your Word you made 
them, . . . in which all things are spoken eternally. . . . In a way I see 
it, but how I am to express it, I do not know." (Augustine, Confessions 
Bk. 11, chaps. 3 (5)-8 (10)
These exercises of Augustine, designed to make sense of the opening verse 
of Genesis by canvassing the grammatical alterations needed for ordinary 
speech to articulate the act of creation, offer a leitmotif for this inquiry. It 
aims to highlight the signal difference between "philosophical theology," 
properly so-called, and "philosophy of religion," as customarily practiced 
today, by showing that "philosophical theology" displays how the ana­
lytic categories it employs must be tailored to the unique subject matter 
it aims to elucidate, while "philosophy of religion" simply presumes that 
current categories will suffice, with the result that the "god" in question
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often becomes tailored to our horizons. I begin with Jean-Luc Marion, 
who came to discover, between writing God without Being (Dieu sans I'etre, 
1989) and a symposium on "onto-theology" at Toulouse in 1995, that the 
being he had wanted to disassociate from God in the earlier book was 
far more akin to Scotus than to Aquinas. I shall use Robert Sokolowski's 
"Christian distinction" (yet showing it to be operative in all Abrahamic 
faith traditions) to trace Marion's "conversion," showing how a coherent 
characterization of the creator must highlight the unique and ineffable 
relation between creatures and creator: a strategy which will require the 
richest possible account of existence. Moreover, any attempt to subsume 
both creator and creatures under a univocal notion of being (as both Rich­
ard Cross and Mary Beth Ingham recount to be Scotus's intent), far from 
providing the indispensable condition for coherent discourse about God, 
can rather easily lead one to be speaking of an idol. For creation is the 
key, and showing how the creator/creatures relation is sui generis—that 
is, incomparable with any relation between two things we know—will 
require special metaphysical resources, while failing to advert to that fact 
will inevitably involve "associating" the creator with creatures, the mir­
ror-image of what Muslims deride as shirk: associating a creature with the 
creator. Moreover, failing to acknowledge the centrality of creation can 
also lead (in a "late capitalist" society) to misconstruing freedom so as 
to identify it with choice (dubbed "libertarian"), a move so common that 
philosophers can simply presume that this theoretic construction consti­
tutes what we mean by "freedom"; whereas explicating human freedom 
as "created freedom" offers a healthy alternative. Finally, contrasting two 
such different strategies could lead readers accustomed to one approach 
rather than the other to miss the point of some arguments offered, for it is 
commonplace that one's ear for "argument" may well differ from one con­
text to another. Yet following the thread to the end should resolve many 
an ambiguity.
In a symposium on "onto-theology" published in the French Dominican 
Revue thomiste (January 1995), Jean-Luc Marion testified that the (by then 
somewhat notorious) central thesis of his God without Being (Dieu sans l'etre) 
had been utterly misguided, for the notion of being he had endeavored to 
excise from God had inadvertently been taken from Scotus rather than 
from Aquinas.1 The outstanding difference between these two medieval 
philosophical theologians lies, of course, in the contrast between univocity 
(Scotus) and analogy (Aquinas) in treating being, even though medieval­
ists remind us that the notion of analogy to which Scotus so vehemently 
objected owed far more to Henry of Ghent than to Aquinas. (Anyone who 
has considered Henry's characterization of analogy can see that Aquinas 
would have rejected it as well.) Indeed, in her astute synoptic presentation 
of John Duns Scotus, Mary Beth Ingham insists: "for Scotus, the primacy 
of being as a univocal concept is revealed as the necessary condition for 
metaphysics, for any language about God and for any science of theol­
ogy." And she summarizes Scotus's reasoning to this principle as follows: 
"every inquiry about God proceeds, by means of a type of reduction, from 
ordinary human experience to a univocal concept common to the created 
and uncreated orders. In addition, every theological inquiry presupposes 
something common to God and the created order."2 One could hardly find
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a clearer statement of what has been characterized as "onto-theology" in 
the world which Marion and others inhabit. (Barry Miller's triptych shows 
a similar dynamic at work in "perfect being theology.")3 At stake is a co­
herent account of creation, and of the creator/creature relation in its utter 
uniqueness, for which I rely explicitly on Robert Sokolowski's prescient 
God o f Faith and Reason, together with my own extension of his "Christian 
distinction" to include Jewish and Muslim analogues.4
Robert Sokolowski introduces "the distinction" of God from creation as 
a decisively Christian achievement, "glimpsed on the margins of reason, 
. . . at the intersection of reason and faith" in his genial monograph, The 
God of Faith and Reason .5 By focusing on the key role which making dis­
tinctions plays in philosophical inquiry, and then turning the very notion 
of a distinction into a conceit or trope, he proceeds to identify just how 
unique is the relation of the creator-of-all with all that is created, something 
which Jewish and Muslim philosophers were also taxed to articulate.6 "The 
distinction" then becomes a way of gesturing towards what indeed dis­
tinguishes those who believe the universe to be freely created by one God 
from anyone else. For the God in question would be God without creating 
all-that-is, so much so that everything-that-is adds nothing to the perfec­
tion of being of such a One. (To use a familiar abstract descriptor, that is 
what "monotheism" entails; not a simple reduction of the number of gods 
to one.) What makes this so significant philosophically is that it forbids 
any ordinary brand of "onto-theology" wherein a notion of being can be 
stretched to include the creator as well as creation, by demanding a way of 
uniquely identifying the creator as the One whose essence is identical with 
its existence. Yet many philosophers presume that a univocal notion which 
captures a residual sameness between creator and creatures, is required in 
order to predicate terms of God. That is what Scotus promised, in conjunc­
tion with his rejection of analogical character of "being." And while it can 
be argued that the account of analogy which he rejected was that of Henry 
of Ghent and not that of Aquinas, the legacy stands, presumably because it 
answers so well to a standing predilection of those philosophers who seem 
to find the practice of "Socratic unknowing" abhorrent.
Moreover, Josef Pieper had signaled the specific contribution of Aqui­
nas to this discussion by noting how "creation is the hidden element in the 
philosophy of St. Thomas."7 His emphasis on philosophy alerts us to extend 
our expectation that Thomas's theology turn axially on free creation to 
include his philosophical work as well. Indeed, Pieper's prescient remark 
shatters any simple bifurcation of "philosophy" from "theology" in Aqui- 
nas,8 while the tendency of contemporary "philosophers of religion" to 
proceed to talk about God without adverting to creation has led me to pre­
fer identifying my work as "philosophical theology," proposing to mark 
the difference precisely by attending to this unique "distinction" which 
Sokolowski uncovers "on the margin of reason, . . . at the intersection of 
reason and faith."9 For unless one does, the abiding danger is that the 
creator will mindlessly be assimilated to creatures, which Islam rightly 
condemns as shirk, that is, so eliding the foundational creator/creature dis­
tinction as to "associate anything created with God," which Maimonides 
identifies as idolatry.10 Any piece of writing which proceeds to talk about 
"God" without adverting to this "distinction" cannot help but speak about
an item in the universe, better called "god."11 But let us see how this pro­
vocative assertion shows itself to be true.
Analogy of Being and "The Distinction"
I have long been indebted to Ralph McInerny, who showed us nearly fifty 
years ago that analogy for Aquinas (its principal proponent) was primarily 
a semantic strategy.12 Not without metaphysical implications, of course, 
since Wittgenstein has reminded us how "essence is expressed by gram­
mar," yet as Aquinas exploited analogous usage, notably in the treatise 
on "divine names," it is rooted in semantics.13 Moreover, more than forty 
years ago I was able to show, with Etienne Gilson's help, that Aquinas 
was not possessed of a "theory" of analogy, but rather had judiciously as­
sembled examples designed to show how inherent judgment is to our ana­
logical use of language.14 And forty years later I find I can summarize this 
contention quite briefly. For in fact we cannot escape using the same term 
(say, "order") in widely diverse contexts, while quite conscious that it will 
identify different descriptive arrangements, yet intending to call attention 
to its cogency in each context precisely by using the same term in both. To 
remind ourselves how pervasively analogous language is demanded of us, 
compare my sister's house with seven relatively small children with the 
desk of a colleague in charge of university finances, where each would de­
scribe things as being "in order." (To keep the academic context, we might 
contrast any colleague's desk with that of the financial vice-president.) One 
could easily essay a functional definition of both "ordered" states, of course, 
as "being able to find what one wants," yet the skills involved in one search 
might escape the other, so any definition meant to embrace diverse analo­
gous uses will itself contain analogous terms, or in this case, practices. In 
this respect, analogous usage will always betray a hint of metaphor.
From this relatively mundane example, we can jump to Paul's exalted: 
"I live now not I but Christ lives in me" (Gal 2:20).15 Clearly "live" means 
something radically different in each use of it here, guaranteed to baffle 
anyone unacquainted with Christianity (and many who are), for in any 
ordinary sense my life is mine, nor can another live in me! We could for­
mulate an apparently univocal bridging concept by identifying life as an 
interior source of motion, but notice how "motion' will be also used analo­
gously here, as between corporeal and intentional movement—in a crisis, 
the best indication of my being alive would be the fluttering of my eyelids, 
yet Paul has much more in mind. So life defined as an interior source of 
motion will only apparently be univocal. Moreover, the semantic phe­
nomenon noticed here can provide a criterion for analogous terms: when 
any attempt to define a term's use will inevitably contain a term which 
must also be parsed analogously—that is, resists a descriptive definition, 
the original term is being used analogously. (Think of Socrates' discover­
ing that he could accept the oracle's commendation once he understood 
that wise persons realize they are not wise, whereas those who are two 
meters tall know full well they are two meters tall.). Indeed, I have argued 
that any evaluative or ethical term must be so construed, as Jesus' manner 
of confounding the Pharisees so nicely displays. To their query: "why is 
it that your teacher eats with tax collectors and sinners?" Jesus responds:
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"I did not come to call the virtuous, but sinners" (Mt 9:11, 13). So "sin­
ner" is transformed from a term of opprobrium to the entrance ticket for 
the "kingdom of God," and in the process we are reminded that it can­
not be a merely descriptive term, so supplying the plot line for Nathan­
iel Hawthorne's Scarlet Letter. And again, the bridging concept "offense 
against God" cannot reasonably entail a set of descriptive actions, unless 
one pretends to know what does or does not offend God; that is, to know 
God. But that simply describes bad preaching! For anyone subjected to 
preaching has developed a keen sense for discriminating good from bad 
by a criterion which could be formulated: preachers who pretend to know 
what they are talking about must be falsifying the message. For both tes­
taments abound in examples pointedly showing how "God's ways are 
not our ways." It is to meet that arresting biblical challenge to any talk 
about divinity that one has recourse to the strategy of analogous uses 
of language, which will also be displayed, as we have seen, in mundane 
contexts, yet which attempts to articulate divinity push to an uncomfort­
able limit. Yet if our language is not so pressed, then purported discourse 
about God will unwittingly yet inevitably direct our reference to "god."
We have stumbled upon the celebrated "distinction" of creator from 
creatures, which Kathryn Tanner formulates by a dual linguistic rule:
For speaking of God as transcendent vis-a-vis the world, avoid both 
a simple univocal attribution of predicates to God and the world [as 
well as] a simple contrast of divine and non-divine predicates. In the 
case of univocity, God is not really transcendent at all. In the case 
of a simple contrast, God's transcendence is not radical enough. We 
can call this first rule a rule for talk of God's transcendence beyond 
both identity and opposition with the non-divine. The second rule is 
as follows: avoid in talk about God's creative agency all suggestions 
of limitation in scope or manner. The second rule prescribes talk of 
God's creative agency as immediate and universally extensive.16
She illustrates and clarifies this rule in action by invoking Aquinas's meta­
physical strategies to specify "the distinction" of creator from creatures in 
such a way that "God's nature is to be identified with God's esse or act of 
existence [so that] God . . . is simply identical with that Act of Existence 
itself in virtue of which any and all determinate kinds are" (p. 60). Yet 
she recognizes how articulating that identity will require fracturing nor­
mal syntax, as "God's identity with what is affirmed only predicatively 
of finite beings now takes the doubly odd form of a substantive use of 'to 
be'"(p. 60), as in "to be God is to-be."17
Now it bears noting that such steps reflect a quest for metaphysical 
strategies answering to the faith-affirmation of free creation, for which 
Aquinas found Avicenna's distinction between essence and existing (esse) 
to be axial, though he had to reformulate it in terms which highlighted 
the act of creation.18 Yet if the source of all that is cannot be identified with 
one of those things, how is one to mark this "distinction?" Avicenna's use 
of "necessary being" relied on his distinction of essence from existing to 
define necessary being as that One whose essence is simply to-be, thereby 
distinguishing creator from all creatures.19 A modal scheme which defines
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necessary as "existing in all possible worlds," on the other hand, not only 
demands that possible world be properly parsed, but falls short of show­
ing how such a being must be the creator. Moreover, on Aquinas's use of 
modality, the One whose essence is simply to-be cannot be "a being" at 
all, but is One in virtue of its very ontological constitution. Indeed, this is 
the oneness of God which is underscored by classical Jewish and Muslim 
thinkers, notably Maimonidies and al-Ghazali, to remind us forcibly how 
God's being one, which is the very essence of their respective faiths, can­
not be parsed as a single individual, and so will require a metaphysical 
strategy akin to that of Avicenna.20 So the relation between this One and 
all that is created cannot be likened to a relation among created things, 
forcing us to search for a way of articulating its uniqueness, so leading 
us ineluctably to "negative theology," of which there are several variet­
ies. Moreover, since analogous uses of language in this domain always 
carry a hint of paradox, they will also lead us in this same direction. In a 
fascinating comparative inquiry, Sara Grant has tried to adapt Shankara's 
technical term, "non-duality" to this purpose, tracing affinities with what 
Aquinas says and refuses to say about this "distinction."21 A striking ex­
ample of how intercultural perspectives can reveal lacunae endemic to 
our settled western mindsets.
It should be clear by now why anyone frustrated by "fracturing ordi­
nary syntax" by affirming a substantive use of "to-be" would want to take 
refuge in Scotus's demand for univocity. But oddly enough, it is the very 
notion of univocal which will prove problematic, and not just for God-talk. 
I have tried to suggest how analogous usage, while it may appear prob­
lematic to philosophers, is the very stuff of evaluative discourse of any 
kind, which should allow us to recognize its ubiquity without needing 
any more of a theory about it than the criteria I have suggested: any pur­
ported definition of an analogous term will contain term(s) which cannot 
be parsed univocally. The demand for univocity rests on two grounds: 
one imaginative and easily dismissed; the other logical, so needing more 
careful examination. The first, regularly invoked by Bill Alston, insists 
that a responsible use of a term which is used in many ways will require 
a priori a univocal thread running through them all. This is the picture 
which Wittgenstein neutralized when he introduced his version of analogy 
as "family resemblance," by reminding us that a hemp rope can succeed 
in tethering a ship to a wharf when no single strand of hemp goes its en­
tire length, even though our imagination cannot comprehend this unless 
we picture the rope having a steel core.22 A deft refutation of Bill Alston's 
apparently evident demand, since if we object to the material example 
we are led to see that Alston's demand also depends on imagining how 
meanings work!
So let us examine the logical demand, which we are told motivated 
Scotus's insistence on univocity between God and creatures: if theologia is 
to be a scientia, then it must proceed by argument, and Socrates showed us 
that any responsible argument demands that the key terms "stand still"; 
they cannot be shifting meanings midstream, as it were. Fair enough, 
yet Aquinas's remarks prefatory to identifying the subject of the Summa 
Theologiae, God, are designed to steer us away from making scientia a pro­
crustean bed into which theologia must at all costs fit: "because we cannot
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know what God is, but rather what He is not; we have no way of con­
sidering how God is, but rather how He is not" (1.3. Prol). Furthermore, 
once we realize how keenly Aquinas pursued his mission to show how 
theologia could be a scientia, in employing Hellenic philosophy to elucidate 
"sacred doctrine," we should be alert to diverse senses of scientia.23 (We 
are reminded of prevailing differences, in practice, between "philosophy 
of religion" and "philosophical theology," with regard to the role played 
by affirmations from a faith-tradition.) What is at stake, of course, is "the 
distinction" of creator from creature, whereas insistence on univocity in 
that context would put the creator on all fours with creatures. Yet in fact, 
a little reflection should remind us that, outside of purely formal systems, 
making arguments always demands that we first specify and then negoti­
ate for context. Indeed, expecting that meanings will always remain in­
variant in diverse contexts leads to demands that we readily excoriate as 
"wooden" or "excessively literal." Recall Gilson's insistence that analogy 
(for Aquinas) is not a conceptual matter (as Cajetan presumed it would be, 
as he tried to answer Scotus's demands), but always involves the judicious 
use of terms to negotiate diverse contexts.24 What Aquinas's account does 
is to call attention to something which always attends our use of evalu­
ative terms, even ones as apparently neutral as "order." Whenever the 
context is not artificially restricted, as in logic or pure mathematics, good 
arguments will always demand judgment, precisely to negotiate the ways 
in which the same term can shift in different contexts. That's simply "the 
way the world is," which could be illustrated more reconditely by noting 
Thomas Kuhn's set of criteria for considering replacing the current para­
digm for "normal science," an illustration which could help deconstruct 
the apparently evident demand Soctus makes for univocity: that otherwise 
theologia would have no chance of being a scientia. For we have countless 
demands (in the history of science) for knowing which have succeeded in 
calling current paradigms into question by attending, as Aristotle says, to 
"the facts themselves." Thus Newtonian explanations become a special 
case of explanation in special relativity.
Yet once we call attention to context, Wittgenstein's "family resem­
blances" heave into view, and we may begin to wonder how we could ever 
secure univocity? In short, the shoe ends up on the other foot: it is univocal 
rather than analogical usage which requires explication. Indeed, short of 
Aristotle's "metaphysical biology," wherein species were determined to be 
one in their capacity to generate their own kind, and not to cross-fertilize, it 
seems chimerical and unduly artifidal—that is, "wooden.," to fix a criterion 
for univocity such that a single term must always remain invariant over 
diverse contexts. And if that be the case among creatures, to introduce the 
explicitly theological context of creation makes univocity ludicrous, for to 
propose "a univocal concept common to the created and uncreated orders" 
(Ingham) cannot but elide the axial "distinction" of creator from creatures, 
which is the lynchpin of every Abrahamic faith! Indeed, unless the pur­
ported "univocal concept" be so abstract as to prove useless, such an insis­
tence would make the creator one with creatures, so constituting idolatry 
(Judaism) or shirk (Islam). Indeed, early Christianity struggled over four 
centuries to find a way of articulating the distinctiveness of Jesus without 
making the Christ to be another alongside God, the very definition of shirk;
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or in Jean-Luc Marion's language and circle, without resort to strategies 
associated with "onto-theology," which demand that there be a univocal 
concept common to the created and uncreated orders. Alternatively, any 
philosophy of religion which intends to be operating in the Jewish, Chris­
tian, or Muslim traditions, all of which concur in presenting God as free 
creator of the universe, will betray the very tradition out of which it pur­
ports to be operating if it fails to find ways to articulate "the distinction" 
of creator from creatures in a fashion which displays its uniqueness, and 
so the utterly gratuitous character of the act of creation; if it fails, in other 
words, to ask how conventional categories will have to be altered to meet 
the demands of the unique creator / creature relation.
Created Freedom
Creation is the key, so that struggling to find a proper way to articulate 
the creator/creature relation, will mark philosophical theologians working 
in the Jewish, Christian, or Islamic traditions, while inattention to it will 
inevitably lead to idolatry, whether acknowledged or not. Freedom offers a 
telling test case as well, for inattention to the grounding context of creation 
has generated countless conundrums regarding divine and human free­
dom, as well as yielded a theory of freedom called "libertarian," which 
many presume fairly defines human freedom, yet which can quite mis­
construe the operative context of created freedom inasmuch as it simply 
overlooks creation. Furthermore, proponents of "libertarian freedom," 
preoccupied with the polarity between "determinism" and "freedom," 
barely attend to the inner dynamics of freedom, content at best to dub it "a 
mystery."25 Yet once we attempt to factor in the creator/creature relation, 
to ask about the freedom of (free) creatures, we are led into an alternative 
space which looks far more congruent with the world in which we live 
and act, as well as resolves many conundrums which those who espouse 
"libertarian freedom" had hoped to address with a purported "free will 
defense." A thoroughly classical alternative will expose the terms of that 
defense to be essentially Mu'tazalite (in a way to be explained), so effec­
tively denying the universal scope of creation. Moreover, the very dynam­
ics of "libertarian freedom", such as they are, also point to a non-explained 
explainer, which attention to creation can rectify, even if the "explanation" 
which creation can give will never be on all fours with ordinary explana­
tion, so never quite fit within a procrustean view of "science."26
First, attention to creation and the unique relation of creator to creatures 
can eliminate the tendency to structure divine and human freedom as a 
zero-sum game, for that very structure simply presumes that the creator 
is an actor along with others, as does language of "concurrence." Yet if we 
take as axiomatic that whenever God acts, God acts as creator; and when­
ever we act, we act as creatures, a fresh scenario emerges. As the "cause 
of being," the creator need not "fiddle" nor "intervene," which would be 
unseemly because it involves a crude category mistake. This grounding 
relation also implies that creatures need not be "prime movers" when it 
comes to their free acts, in order for the acts to be free. Nor does the cre­
ator's activity stand over against that of the creature, as when one creature 
pushes or blocks another, for the creator is not so related to creatures. So
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it is not necessary, for creatures to be free, that they somehow be removed 
from the activity of the creator. In fact, such a proposal would be incoher­
ent in a metaphysics of creation. Yet that was the striking claim of the early 
Mu'tazalite theologians in Islam, as it remains the presumption of many 
current philosophers of religion. What wreaks the havoc here is the hid­
den premise, presumed yet seldom articulated, that a free action must in 
fact be an act of creation. Or to put it in a misleading way, that the human 
agent must be a "prime mover" if the human agent is to be free.27 Here 
the context of "determinism," together with claims of nineteenth-century 
science, proves to be distracting, for discourse involving "creation" and 
"prime mover" requires a far more robust metaphysical context.
Demanding that the creator would have somehow to "withdraw" to 
assure creatures' freedom (as in the cabbalist tsimtsum picture) imagina­
tively misapprehends the unique relationship we have already sketched: a 
"non-contrastive" sense of divine transcendence, to use Kathryn Tanner's 
expression. Yet that was exactly what the Mu'tazalites contended in early 
Islam: that in order to assure their freedom, it must be said that God cre­
ated everything except human actions. But this contention presumed a key 
premise which explicitly put creature and creator in a zero-sum situation: 
that authentic agents must indeed be creators. Yet before long an Islamic 
sensibility, which accentuated "the distinction," saw how exempting the 
ample domain of human actions from the creator's purview and sway 
would seriously demean the creator. So another view began to prevail, 
the outlines of which are not relevant to our discussion here.28 What is 
relevant, however, is Aquinas's deft resolution of this apparent impasse, 
in his insistence that while agents whose actions were caused by another 
would not be free (the "determinism" issue), that need not mean that free 
agents be the "total cause" of their actions; that is, that to act freely they 
would have to create.29 Indeed, nothing prevents the creator from being 
involved in free actions since the sui generis relation between creator and 
creatures assures that the creator is not "another" in any ordinary sense. 
This reminder shows how a re-appraisal of human freedom is inherently 
linked with the metaphysical probing of the first section of the paper, and 
whoever finds the assertion startling might wish to consult the works 
noted here.30
More positively, the fact that humans are created in the image of the 
creator reinforces Socrates' contention that human agents cannot but act 
for "the good," however distortedly they may perceive it. We have no 
choice about that; but the very indeterminacy of "the good," reflected in 
inherently analogous uses of "good", assures that such an inbuilt orien­
tation can in no way determine us to a single course of action. On the 
contrary, that very indeterminacy opens us to countless possibilities, so 
providing the ground for rational choice.31 But this inbuilt orientation to 
the good also assures us that freedom involves more than choosing, as a 
closer look at its dynamics diverts us from deeming it to rest entirely on 
our initiative; it is at heart a response to the lure of "the good." (No alarm 
would succeed in getting us out of bed without the prospect of fruitful 
activity.) So while free actions cannot have an impelling cause, an invit­
ing one does not detract from their freedom so much as it enables it. As 
Aristotle's "prime mover" did not push but attract, so "the good" draws
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us on and empowers our choices by giving them a proper telos. Which 
also means that malicious actions are such because they (in some mysteri­
ous manner—the "surd of sin") bypass or run counter to this orientation 
as we refuse to let ourselves be engaged by it. In this sense, it is primarily 
malicious actions which display the marks of "libertarian freedom," yet 
do so by refusing the dynamics of the orientation to the good. So it seems 
odd to regard freedom so construed as paradigmatic for human free ac­
tion, since, by running counter to the inbuilt orientation to "the good" by 
virtue of a refusal, evil actions can only be considered less than full-blown 
actions. Herbert Fingarette has articulated this nicely, with the internal 
paradoxes which beset it, in his prescient Self-deception, where he uses 
the pregnant metaphor of "refusing to 'spell out' our engagements" to 
account for the pervasive yet elusive syndrome of self-deception, which 
must attend evil actions.32
Finally, to recall the thin scenario proffered for free actions by "liber­
tarian freedom," we must ask how the free act originates? Indeed, we 
have seen how the very inability to answer this question has prompted 
some to speak of "the mystery of freedom." But that would be a deficient 
view of mystery, more akin to what my teacher, Bernard Lonergan, used 
to call "objective obscurity." For like the "surd of sin," another expres­
sion of Lonergan's, there is no identifiable source for the initiative which 
"libertarian freedom" presumes and demands. As if to emphasize how 
much this theory of freedom lacks the robust consistency of an orien­
tation to "the good," one might suggest the crude metaphor of "self- 
goosing," for their depiction of free actions has no way of accounting 
for their emergence, except that they be uncaused by another creature or 
systemic arrangement. For having eschewed even attempting to speak 
of a constitutive relation of such a unique sort as creation, and for other 
reasons, unable to speak of human intentional agency in any terms but 
purportedly "scientific" ones, no explanation for human freedom as pure 
initiative can be forthcoming. What has utterly escaped the proponents 
of "libertarian freedom," however, is the deeply responsive character of 
human action, for any human initiative is grounded in a response; as "the 
good" names not an impulse but a lure.33 Yet were it the case that none of 
this could be said without first affirming a creator, and then attempting 
coherently to formulate that creator's unique relation to creatures, then 
the multiple incoherencies of "libertarian freedom" would offer an ob­
ject lesson in the limits of paganism. But that would only compound the 
indictment: if univocity can easily lead to idolatry, a "libertarian" theory 
about freedom favors a pagan account of human action. What emerges 
as heartening, however, is that the twin alternatives of analogous uses 
of language and goal-oriented freedom seem far more descriptive of the 
human situation than these philosophical theories proposed to explicate 
it. Might that have something to say about the fruitfulness of a revelation 
which grounds the universe in a free creator, as well as the fruitfulness 
of attempts to render that asseveration coherent: that they prove to be 
more congruent with human experience than constructed alternatives? 
So "philosophical theology" not only proves to be more faithful to Jew­
ish, Christian, and Muslim faith traditions than much "philosophy of 
religion," but more attuned to the reaches of human experience as well,
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thereby offering a telling illustration of the way revelation can enrich 
philosophical inquiry.
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